Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value by Casajus, André
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Casajus, André
Working Paper
Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf
value
Working Paper // Universität Leipzig, No. 99
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität Leipzig
Suggested citation: Casajus, André (2011) : Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value,
Working Paper // Universität Leipzig, No. 99, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50537 
      Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 










































 Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
André Casajus
yzx
(August 2011, this version: September 19, 2011, 18:39)
Abstract
We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf
value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261–281)
and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47–67). In particular, we
show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent.
Combined with the dummy player axiom, any of the collusion prop-
erties has strong symmetry implications whenever the cardinality of
the player set exceeds two. Finally, we establish that the Banzhaf
value is non-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom
and any of the collusion properties, provided that the player set is as
above.
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1. Introduction
There are numerous characterizations of the Banzhaf value—…rst introduced by
Banzhaf (1965) for voting games and later extended to general TU games by Owen
(1975)—both on …xed and on variable player sets. On the variable ones, the concise
characterization by Casajus (2011, Theorem 7) employs just two axioms, the dummy
player axiom and some very appealing amalgamation property, 2-e¢ciency, due to
Lehrer (1988).
Let us explain 2-e¢ciency. When player j is amalgamated to player i in a TU
game, j leaves the game as a genuine player, but “sits on the shoulders” of player i,
i.e., with respect to the creation of worth, player j is present in a coalition whenever
player i is so. 2-e¢ciency then requires the payo¤ of player i in the amalgamated
game to be the sum of the individual payo¤s of players i and j in the original game,
i.e., amalgamating players doesn’t matter.
Later on, Haller (1994) suggests a collusion property (which we will call proxy
neutrality) that breathes the spirit of 2-e¢ciency, but works on a …xed player set.
Instead of leaving the game, player j stays in the game as a null player. Em-
ploying proxy neutrality or related collusion properties—association neutrality or
distrust neutrality, Haller (1994) and Malawski (2002) suggest characterizations
of the Banzhaf value on …xed player sets, which in addition employ the dummy
player axiom, symmetry/symmetry invariance, and either linearity or marginality
(Young, 1985). Since both authors do not address the redundancy issue and in view
of Casajus (2011, Theorem 7), one may be tempted to suspect that one could drop
symmetry, linearity, or marginality from these characterizations, at least for the ones
that invoke proxy neutrality.
In most cases, this suspicion turns out to be justi…ed. First, we show that the
three collusion properties are equivalent (Theorem 1), despite of their di¤ering literal
meaning. Further, any of the collusion properties combined with the dummy player
axiom already entails symmetry, provided that the player set comprises more than
two players (Theorem 2). Building on the former results, we …nally establish that
the Banzhaf value is non-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom
and any of the collusion properties, again, on player sets containing at least three
players (Theorem 3).
The plan of this paper is as follows: Basic de…nitions and notation are given in
the second section. The third section establishes the relation between the collusion3
properties. In the fourth section, we explore symmetry implications of the collusion
properties. Section …ve provides our characterizations of the Banzhaf value. Some
remarks conclude the paper.
2. Basic definitions and notation
Let U be a su¢ciently large in…nite set, the universe of players; N(U) denotes
the set of non-empty and …nite set of subsets of U. A (TU) game on U is a
pair (N;v) consisting of a set of players N 2 N(U) and a coalition function v 2
V(N) :=
￿
f : 2N ! Rjf (;) = 0
￿
. Subsets of N are called coalitions, and v (K) is
called the worth of coalition K. For v;w 2 V(N); ￿ 2 R; the coalition functions
v + w 2 V(N) and ￿ ￿ v 2 V(N) are given by (v + w)(K) = v (K) + w(K) and
(￿ ￿ v)(K) = ￿ ￿ v (K) for all K ￿ N: For K ￿ N and v 2 V(N); vjK 2 V(K)
denotes the restriction of v to 2K: For T ￿ N; T 6= ;; the game (N;uT), uT (K) = 1
if T ￿ K and uT (K) = 0 otherwise, is called a unanimity game. Any v 2 V(N)








jTj￿jSj ￿ v (S): (1)
Player i 2 N is called a dummy player in (N;v) i¤ v (K [ fig)￿v (K) = v (fig)
for all K ￿ Nnfig; if in addition v (fig) = 0; then i is called a null player; players
i;j 2 N are called symmetric in (N;v) if v (K [ fig) = v (K [ fjg) for all K ￿
Nnfi;jg. Let N0 (v) denote the set of null players in (N;v):
A value on N 2 N(U) is an operator ' that assigns a payo¤ vector '(N;v) 2
RN to any v 2 V(N); a value on N(U) is an operator ' that assigns a payo¤ vector
'(N;v) 2 RN to any N 2 N(U) and v 2 V(N): For K ￿ N; we set 'K (N;v) =
P




v (K [ fig) ￿ v (K)
2jNj+1 ; (N 2 N(U)), v 2 V(N), i 2 N:
(2)






v (K [ fjg); i 2 K;
v (K); i = 2 K;
K ￿ Nnfjg: (3)4
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v (K [ fi;jg); K \ fi;jg 6= ;;
v (K); K \ fi;jg = ;;







v (K); fi;jg ￿ K;
v (Knfi;jg); fi;jg * K;
K ￿ N; (6)
respectively.
Below, we list the axioms that are used later on. Unless made explicit, these
axioms are supposed to hold for …xed N;N0 2 N(U).
Linearity, L. For all v;w 2 V(N) and ￿ 2 R; '(N;v + w) = '(N;v) + '(N;w)
and '(N;￿ ￿ v) = ￿ ￿ '(N;v):
Null player, N. For all v 2 V(N) and all i 2 N, who are null players in (N;v);
'i (N;v) = 0:
Null player out, NPO. For all N 2 N(U), v 2 V(N), all i 2 N, who are null





Dummy player, D. For all v 2 V(N) and all i 2 N, who are dummy players in
(N;v); 'i (N;v) = v (fig):
Symmetry, S. For all v 2 V(N) and all i;j 2 N, who are symmetric in (N;v);
'i (N;v) = 'j (N;v):
Isomorphism invariance, II. For all N;N0 2 N(U); any bijection ￿ : N ! N0;
and v 2 V(N), we have '￿(i) (N0;v ￿ ￿￿1) = 'i (N;v) for all i 2 N, where v ￿￿￿1 2
V(N0) is given by (v ￿ ￿￿1)(K0) = v (￿￿1 (K0)); K0 ￿ N0:
Symmetry invariance, SI. For all v 2 V(N), i 2 N; and all bijections ￿ : N ! N,
'￿(i) (N;v ￿ ￿￿1) = 'i (N;v):
Marginality, M. For all v;w 2 V(N) and all i 2 N such that v (K [ fig) ￿ v (K)
= w(K [ fig) ￿ w(K) for all K ￿ Nnfig, 'i (N;v) = 'i (N;w):
2-E¢ciency, 2E. For all N 2 N(U), v 2 V(N); and i;j 2 N; i 6= j, 'i (Nnfjg;vij)
= 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v):5













= 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v):










= 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v):










= 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v):
3. Relation between the collusion properties
Despite their structural similarity, the immediate economic content of the three
collusion properties is quite di¤erent. PN requires two players’ joint payo¤ not to be
a¤ected when their economic power is shifted to one of them—their proxy, while the
other becomes completely powerless. In contrast, AN and DN treat the colluding
players symmetrically. Under the association agreement of AN embodied in (5),
any of them alone is as productive as they jointly are, whereas under the distrust
agreement of DN due to (6), both players alone are completely unproductive, while
their joint economic force remains una¤ected.
The following theorem reveals that these collusion properties ultimately entail
the same economic implications. The reason for this equivalence seems to be the
that they all impose similar and interrelated consistency requirements on values.
Later on, this fact turns out to be useful in extending claims involving D and PN
to related claims that invoke AN or DN instead of PN. Note that PN invites
the application of D (or just N), while the other collusion properties do not so.
Generically, PN turns non-null players into null-players, which can be handled by
D.
Theorem 1. PN, AN, and DN are equivalent.
Proof. (i) AN implies PN and DN. Let ' on N 2 N(U) obey AN. By (4), (5)

























































￿ AN = 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v):
Hence, ' obeys PN. Analogously for DN.6














ij for all i;j 2 N and v 2 V(N): The proof now continues as in (i),
respectively. ￿
4. Collusion properties and symmetry
Casajus (2011, Theorem 1) establishes that 2E has strong symmetry implications.
In particular, 2E implies II, hence, SI and S (all on N(U)). Since 2E and PN
breathe the same spirit, PN may entail similar symmetry properties.
Of course, II is out of reach because PN applies to a …xed player set. Yet, PN
alone is not powerful enough to trigger SI or just S, except, of course, when they
have no implications at all, i.e., for jNj = 1: For jNj > 1; …x some non-constant
mapping ￿ : N ! R and consider the value '(1) on N given by
'
(1)
i (N;v) = Bai (N;v) + ￿ (i); i 2 N; v 2 V(N): (7)
While '(1) inherits PN from Ba; this does not hold true for SI or S.
Note that '(1) violates D. But even PN and D together do not enforce SI or S
for jNj = 2; but otherwise they do so. To see the former, consider the value '(2) on
N = f1;2g given by
'
(2)
1 (N;v) = v (f1g) and '
(2)
2 (N;v) = v (N) ￿ v (f1g); v 2 V(N); (8)
which satis…es both PN and D, but obviously fails SI and S.
Theorem 2. If jNj 6= 2; then (PN or AN or DN) and D imply S.
Proof. By Theorem 1, it su¢ces to show this for PN. For jNj = 1; nothing is to
show. Let now jNj > 2 and let ' on N obey PN and D. Further, let i and j be










￿ 'j (N;v): (9)
Moreover, (4), PN, and D imply
'k (N;v
p











































ki : Again by (4),




















Finally, (9)–(12) together yield 'i (N;v) = 'j (N;v): ￿
Remark 1. Malawski (2002, Section 6) did a small step towards Theorem 2 by
considering relaxations of S.
5. Collusion properties and the Banzhaf value
Only recently, Casajus (2011, Theorem 7) shows that the Banzhaf value (on N(U))
is characterized by D and 2E, entailing that the characterization by Nowak (1997,
Theorem) via D, 2E, S, and M is redundant. Since PN is in the spirit of 2E and
by Theorem 1, one might curious whether the same holds true for the characteriza-
tions by Haller (1994, Propositions 7 and 8) and Malawski (2002, Theorem 3 and
Corollary 2), which besides one of the collusion properties and D employ S/SI and
either L or M. By Theorems 1 and 2, and Malawski (2002, Corollary 2), we already
know that S/SI can be dropped whenever jNj 6= 2: Yet, we have even more.
Theorem 3. If jNj 6= 2; then the Banzhaf value on N is the unique value that
satis…es (PN or AN or DN) and D.
Proof. In view of Theorem 1, it su¢ces to show this for PN. By Haller (1994,
Proposition 7) and (2), Ba on N meets PN and D, respectively. Remains to deal
with uniqueness. Let ' obey PN and D. For jNj = 1; the claim is immediate from
D. Let now jNj > 2. We proceed by induction on jNnN0 (v)j.
Induction basis: For v 2 V(N); jNnN0 (v)j < 2; '(N;v) = Ba(N;v) holds by
D. Consider now v 2 V(N); jNnN0 (v)j = 2: Again by D, 'i (N;v) = Bai (N;v) for
i 2 N0 (v): W.l.o.g., let NnN0 (v) = f1;2g and 3 2 N0 (v): By (1), we have
v = ￿1 ￿ uf1g + ￿2 ￿ uf2g + ￿12 ￿ uf1;2g; ￿1;￿2;￿12 2 R:
Let w 2 V(N),




+ ￿12 ￿ uf1;2g:8




12 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)￿uf3g+(2 ￿ ￿2 + ￿12)￿uf1g: Further, 3 and 1 are
dummy players in (N;w) and (N;w
p
12); respectively. By (4), PN, and D, we have
'1 (N;w) + ￿1 ￿ ￿2 = '1 (N;w) + '3 (N;w) = '1 (N;w
p
13) = '1 (N;v) (13)
and
'1 (N;w) + '2 (N;w) = '1 (N;w
p
12) = 2 ￿ ￿2 + ￿12: (14)
By Theorem 2, ' meets S. Since i and j are symmetric in (N;w); (13) and (14)
already imply
'1 (N;v) = ￿1 +
￿12
2
= Ba1 (N;v): (15)
By (4), v
p
12 = (￿1 + ￿2 + ￿12) ￿ uf1g, and 1 is a dummy player in (N;v12): Thus,
(4), PN, and D entail
'1 (N;v) + '2 (N;v) = '1 (N;v) = ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿12: (16)
Finally, (15) and (16) yield




Induction hypothesis: Suppose '(N;v) = Ba(N;v) for v 2 V(N); jNnN0 (v)j ￿
k; k 2 N; k ￿ 2.
Induction step: Let v 2 V(N); jNnN0 (v)j = k + 1: By D, 'i (N;v) = Bai (N;v)
for i 2 N0 (v): By PN and D, ('i (N;v))i2NnN0(v) is a solution to the following
system of linear equations














￿ < jNnN0 (v)j: Hence, by the induction hypothesis, the right-
hand side of (17) is determined by Ba. Since Ba meets PNand D, (Bai (N;v))i2NnN0(v)
is a solution to (17), which is unique because of jNnN0 (v)j ￿ 3: ￿
Remark 2. Note that the proof of Theorem 3 rests on ideas of the proofs of Lehrer
(1988, Remark 3) and Casajus (2011, Theorem 7), the former in the induction step
and the latter in the crucial part of the induction basis. Embarrassingly, the use of
Theorem 2 in this proof indicates that the proofs of Casajus (2011, Theorem 7 and
Corollary 8) can be considerably simpli…ed by using Casajus (2011, Theorem 1) :(
Remark 3. For jNj > 2; our characterizations are non-redundant. The Shapley
(1953) value meets D, but fails PN, AN, and DN. The value '(1) from (7) obeys
PN, AN, and DN, but fails D.9
Remark 4. Theorem 3 fails for jNj = 2: Consider the values '(2) 6= Ba from (8) and









v (f1g) + v (f2g)
￿ ￿N (v); v (f1g) + v (f2g) 6= 0;
v (fig) + 1
2 ￿ ￿N (v); v (f1g) + v (f2g) = 0;
i 2 N; v 2 V(N); which both satisfy D, PN, AN, and DN. Moreover, it doesn’t
help to add only one of the following axioms: L, M or S/SI. Just observe that
'(2) meets L and M, but not S/SI, whereas '(3) obeys S/SI but neither L nor M.
Hence, the Haller (1994, Propositions 7 and 8) and Malawski (2002, Theorem 3 and
Corollary 2) characterizations are non-redundant for jNj = 2:
6. Conclusion
The main point of this paper is that the collusion properties suggested by Haller
(1994) and Malawski (2002) are equivalent and have stronger implications then
observed so far. These implications resemble those of 2E, recently discovered by
Casajus (2011). Quite naturally, this triggers the question on the relation between
2E and the collusion properties.
Theorem 4. 2E implies PN, AN, and DN on N(U).































2E = 'i (N;v) + 'j (N;v);
i.e., ' meets PN on N: In view of Theorem 1, this already completes the proof. ￿
Of course, there is no hope to have a strong counterpart to Theorem 4 in the
opposite direction. First, the collusion properties apply to a …xed player set. And
second, other than 2E, PN keeps the null player generated by the proxy agreement.
While invoking NPO may remedy to the former obstacle, the second one can be
dealt with by N. The obvious proof is left to the reader. Further, it is not too
di¢cult to check that one cannot do without NPO or N.10
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